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Abstract: the “social skill” (Fligstein, 1997 and 2001) attributed to social entrepreneurs is not 
sufficiently explicit as regards their dispositions for engaging in actions of change. After 
placing the status of change in the context of institutionalist literature, we intend to show 
how, with the help of Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of field and habitus, it is possible to develop 
what we call an institutional portfolio allowing a micro-individual analysis of the capacity of 
some  individuals  to  undertake  institutional  transformations  without  losing  sight  of  the 
evolution  –  at  a  macro-analytical  level  –  of  the  structure  of  the  field  in  which  these 
individuals  operate.  In  this  respect,  we  intend  to  contribute  to  the  various  attempts  at 













Résumé :  la  « compétence  sociale »  (Fligstein,  1997  et  2001)  attribuée  à  l’entrepreneur 
institutionnel  ne  nous  en  dit  pas  suffisamment  sur  les  dispositions  profondes  qui  lui 
permettent de s’engager dans des actions de changement. Aussi, après avoir resitué le statut 
du changement dans la littérature institutionnaliste, nous montrons comment, à partir de la 
théorie du champ et de l’habitus développée par Pierre Bourdieu, il est possible d’élaborer ce 
que  nous  appelons  un  portefeuille  institutionnel  qui  rend  possible  l’analyse  micro-
individuelle  de  la  capacité  de  certains  individus  à  entreprendre  des  transformations 
institutionnelles,  et  cela,  sans  perdre  de  vue  l’évolution  conjointe  à  un  macro  niveau 
d’analyse, la structure du champ dans lequel ces individus opèrent. A ce titre nous entendons 
apporter une contribution aux efforts de réflexion visant à lever le paradoxe de l’« embedded 
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  Ironically, change is undoubtedly the most recalcitrant object with which organizational 
institutionalism has to deal. The institutionalism of the early days, the old institutionalism 
according to Selznick (1949, 1957) stressed the importance of individual decision-making 
which meant that changes were considered as being part of organizations. In reaction, new 
institutionalism (Meyer  and Rowan, 1977 ; Zucker, 1977 ; Powell and DiMaggio, 1983) 
reversed the focus by placing the organizational field and its environment (norms, culture…) 
at  the  centre  of  all  observations,  relegating  the  individual  to  the  position  of  a  structural 
epihenomena.  This  fratricidal  dispute  resulted  in  both  a  certain  inability  to  grasp  intra-
organizational tensions and a variation in the responses of organizations to their environment. 
Neo-institutionalists were to take the wise step of initiating their own reform by trying to 
restore some of the individual’s strategic consciousness (DiMaggio, 1988). Consequently, the 
notion of “institutional entrepreneurship” was to contribute to bringing together structure and 
action, the organizational field and the individual (Sewell, 1992 ; Barley and Tolbert, 1997 ; 
Seo, Creed, 2002) and therefore reconcile the “ancients” and the “moderns” (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996 ; Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997). 
  Despite what has been achieved to overcome the paradox of the “embedded agency” 
(Greenwood, Suddaby, 2006), this article aims to show that more remains to be done to take 
into account the individual entrepreneurs’ capacity to transform the institutions linked to their 
respective organizational fields. It is indeed possible to extend the definition of the space of 
action which the institutional entrepreneur enjoys (or appropriates!) in spite of the weighty 
constraints brought by the structure of the field. The first studies devoted to “social skill” 
(Fligstein, 1997, 2001) put us on the right track but, ignoring as they do the symbolic, social, 
cultural and economic resources which the institutional entrepreneurs are likely to mobilize  
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in  processes  of  organizational  change,  they  also  leave  aside  the  institutional  micro-
foundations  present  in  processes  of  de-institutionalization  or  re-institutionalization 
(Jepperson,  1991 ;  Suddaby  and  Greenwood,  2001 ;  Greenwood,  Suddaby  and  Hinings, 
2002; Maguire, Hardy, Lawrence, 2004).  
  We intend to demonstrate here the need to shed light on what we call the institutional 
portfolio held by each individual in a given field which, in terms of the structure and history 
of  the  organizational  field,  can  cast  new  light  on  individual  initiatives  in  institutional 
transformation. 
  To  do  this,  we  will  first  define  the  status  of  change  in  organizational  neo-
institutionalism. After bringing back the notion of interest, we will show how institutionalism 
overcomes its divisions by combining “structure” and “action”. We will then look at the 
latest  institutionalist  progress  on  “social  skill”. Secondly,  we  will  analyze  the  theoretical 
compatibility between neo-institutionalism and Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of field and habitus 
in order to shed light on how well the latter contributes to an analysis of human processes of 
transforming organizations and the organizational field. 
 
 
I. CHANGE IN NEO-INSTITUTIONALISM 
 
Restoring the place of interest 
 
  Change is far from being unknown territory in new institutionalism (Jepperson, 1991; 
Campbell  2004)  and  considerable  energy  has  been  put  into  establishing  categories 
(“evolutionary  change”  versus  “revolutionary  change”,  “punctuated  evolution”  versus 
“punctuated equilibrium”…). Internal and external predictive factors of change have also  
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been studied (Oliver, 1992). Among the studies devoted to change, many have shown greater 
interest in studying completed change on a macro-analytical level, than ongoing change on a 
micro-analytical level (Zucker, 1977 and 1991: 106; Brint and Karabel 1989 and 1991). Such 
taxonomic  thinking  which  does  not  explain  institutionalization  processes  -  “Institutional 
theory  tells  us  relatively  little  about  ‘institutionalization’  as  an  unfinished  process  (as 
opposed  to  an  achieved  state”,  (DiMaggio,  1988:  12)  -  thereby  showing  the  limits  of 
institutional theory (“Institutional theory is always in danger of forgetting that labeling a 
process or structure does not explain it”, Zucker, in Powell and DiMaggio, 1991: 106), is 
handicapped  by  its  inability  to  consider  the  individual  as  having  interests  and  acting  in 
accordance with them (Friedland and Alford, 1991). In other words, for this first kind of new 
institutionalism, not only do individuals have the greatest difficulty in the world identifying 
their interest, they are also incapable of implementing appropriate strategies to satisfy those 
interests. This being the case, norms and preconscious assumptions play a determining or 
even  exclusive  role  in  guiding  the  hand  of  the  individual.  Any  individual  strategy  is 
inconceivable from this theoretical standpoint. 
  A gradual opening up to the notion of interest (“the selective deployment of interest in 
institutional explanations”, DiMaggio 1988: 7), and to the heterogeneity of change processes 
(“we need an enhanced understanding of both the sources of heterogeneity in institutional 
environments and the processes that generate institutional change”, Powell, 1991: 183) gives 
the  possibility  of  reaching  beyond  a  “static,  constrained,  and  oversocialized  view  of 
organizations” (Powell, 1991: 183). By including varied organizational forms and individual 
interests in the analysis, new perspectives can be opened up to institutionalism (Fligstein, 
1991).  While  undeniable  persistence  phenomena  (Zucker,  1977)  specific  to  each 
organizational field cannot be ruled out, there are also variations that must be grasped and 
explained. Institutionalism must therefore study the heterogeneity or variety of organizational  
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logics within the scope of the organizationally possible. To think in this way is to restore the 
role of the individual in change processes and organizational strategies in which they occupy 
a key position (Munir, 2005). To acknowledge the effects of socially-formed schemes of 
perception and appreciation structuring individual action socially, and leading individuals to 
act  in  line  with  some  form  of  “taken  for  grantedness”  (Berger  and  Luckmann,  1966)  or 
“collective representations [that] operate on their own” (Stinchcombe, 1997 : 2), is not to 
transform the individual into a social marionette driven exclusively by norms and culture. 
Acknowledging the limits on individual action – limits that can be associated, among other 
things, with the three “regulatory, normative and cognitive pillars” (Scott, 2001), to which I 
must add the hierarchic position of the individual within the organization and the position of 
the organization within the field – does not rule out forms of (even relative) variations in the 
responses elaborated by individuals when faced with an “environmental pressure” such as, 
for example, a technological innovation. This could be summarized by the dialectic of the 
epistemological pair : “exogenous pressure” versus “different endogenous reaction of non 
passive actors” (Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002).  
  The  active  individual  must  step  out  into  the  open  because,  even  socialized  and 
structured  as  they  may  be,  individuals  (re)act  by  interpreting  situations.  Even  if 
environmental pressure on a given organizational field is exerted with the same force on all 
the organizations in the field – and it is far from certain that this is the case – the processes 
taking place in the organizations in the field sometimes compete with each other (Lounsbury, 
2001 and 2007, Townley, 2002). These rivalries are the product of the relatively singular 
backgrounds of the individuals making up the organizations, of balances of power between 
different  coalitions  within  the  organization  and  competition  between  the  various 
organizations in a given field. Relatively speaking, Powell and DiMaggio (1991) say much 
the same thing when they call for the edification of a multi-dimensional theory and a return  
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to what I will take the liberty of calling the repressed side of the earliest throes of new 
institutionalist  theory,  meaning  the  notions  of  individual  action,  balance  of  power  and 
struggles for interest and power, and therefore of change or resistance to change. These are 
all  phenomena  which  are  commonly  encountered  in  companies  and  in which  individuals 
always play the key role. In this call for convergence, there is a will to combine together 
within a single theoretical approach the long-emphasized decisive role of social structure or 
“market-based” vision (Fligstein, 1991, 1997 and 2001) and the role of individual action in a 
form of power over organizations which cannot be neglected without running the risk of 
losing something along the way! 
 
“We suspect that something has been lost in the shift from the old to the new institutionalism. 
Although the prime importance of assimilating the cognitive revolution to sociological theory is 
undeniable, we agree with Alexander (1987) that the goal must be a sounder multidimensional 
theory, rather than a one-sidedly cognitive one. Indeed, one of the key purposes […] was to 
expand the universe of discourse in institutional theory to include researchers whose work 
placed more emphasis on the strategic and political elements of action and institutional change. 
The result […] has been to integrate more firmly organizational institutionalism with general 
sociology, to place interests and power on the institutional agenda, and to clarify and deepen 
the conversation about the form that a theory of change might take”
2 (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991: 27). 
 
Overcoming the dichotomy between structure and action 
 
  The notion of institutional entrepreneurship provides the outline of a response to this 
theoretical  imperative  in  that  enables  us  to  establish  the  connection  between  new 
organizational institutionalism and what Stinchombe calls “the guts of institutions” (1997: 
17); in other words, to allow a role for individuals driven to a greater extent by their interests 
-  “organized  actors  with  sufficient  resources  (institutional  entrepreneurs)  [who]  see  in 
[changes] an opportunity to realize an interest that they value highly” (DiMaggio, 1988: 14). 
This  conception  of  the  individual  supposes  intense  political  activity  expressed  through 
                                                 
2 My italics.  
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struggles of interest and power relations  (Levy  and Scully, 2007) which are exacerbated 
during  periods  of  organizational  change.  The  notion  of  institutional  entrepreneurship  is 
heuristically powerful and allows us to bring together in a hitherto unlikely pairing the notion 
of “action” and “institution” (Barley and Tolbert, 1997), “structure” and “agency” (Sewell, 
1992;  Seo  and  Creed,  2002),  to  overcome  the  paradox  of  the  “embedded  agency” 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). We mean agent here in the sense of a subject possessing 
resources and capable of acting on the world (“agency refers to an actor’s ability to have 
some effect on the social world”, Scott, 2001: 76) in accordance with their interests (“Actors 
who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to 
create new institutions or to transform existing ones”, Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence, 2004: 
657) by opposition to an agent conceived as an “oversocialized” or socially overdetermined 
subject (Powell, 1991).  
  Contradictio  in  adjecto,  the  institutional  entrepreneur  makes  the  construction  of 
meaning possible, and therefore also the institutional renewal or institutional innovation that 
was difficult to conceive of hitherto. The institutional entrepreneur, without being free of all 
institutional constraint - as might be envisaged in the economic theory of the rational actor – 
is an actor in the organization who is endowed with particular resources and who, working in 
pre-reflexive mode, acts in an imperfectly rational manner yet remains reasonable and knows 
how to look after his or her interests in new institutional forms. In this respect, I believe that 
institutional entrepreneurs are unifiers rather than inventors. Their talent consists ultimately 
not so much in creating intrinsically original items (which are in fact socially supplied), but 
in the singular way they organize the assembly or combination of these socially-shaped parts 
in the light of their personal background and position in time (Dorado, 2005: 388). This 
freedom of assembly is not without its limits, those of the social conditions of production by 
the assembler, because history and background are never quite forgotten, except perhaps by  
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those who, as Mauss said, pay themselves with counterfeit currency of their dreams
3 and 
imagine themselves infinitely capable of assembling the parts of the organizational game in a 
multitude of combinations in an illusion of freedom. The product of the “structure” versus 
“agency” dialectic, institutional entrepreneurship enables us to  grasp and account for the 
interaction  between  the  institutions  that  shape  individuals  and  the  individuals  who  are 
constantly exerting their action on the institutions in the name of institutional renewal and the 
possibility  of  individual  action  (“actors  [that]  shape  emerging  institutions  and  transform 
existing ones despite the complexities and path dependences”, Garud, Hardy and Maguire, 
2007: 957). 
  Returning  for  a  moment  to  the  primary  meaning  of  the  terms,  an  institutional 
entrepreneur is a person who undertakes a particular form of enterprise which is worth a 
closer look. Institutional entrepreneurship is a socially risky activity challenging the norm 
and giving rise to intense political activity to put together “new systems of meaning” and 
“institutional  arrangements”.  The  action  consisting  in  structuring  the  institutional 
environment remains “bricolage” without a future if the institutional arrangements are not 
“theorized”  or  “commodified”  in  easily  acceptable  forms  within  the  framework  of  field-
specific  practices  to  favor  their  “colonization”  and  establish  them  as  recognized  norms 
(“reinstitutionalization”),  (Greenwood,  Suddaby  and  Hinings,  2002;  Maguire,  Hardy, 
Lawrence,  2004;  Suddaby  and  Greenwood,  2001).  Taking  part  in  such  normative 
decomposition-recomposition  processes  requires  particular  dispositions  on  the  part  of  the 
institutional entrepreneur. Indeed, the normative innovation disposition supposes a certain 
social distance from the norm, thereby opening up the possibility of breaking or moving 
away from that norm. This enterprise of more or less intentional contestation undertaken 
relatively consciously, therefore contains the expression of what might wrongly appear to be 
                                                 
3 My translation  
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a  form  of  social  audacity,  but  which  is  probably  a  question  of  position  in  the  field  in 
question, more than anything else. The term distance used here may lead to confusion. I do 
not mean that institutional entrepreneurs are rational actors who, even within the limits of 
their rationality, succeed in placing themselves above the social world in order to act on it in 
acute awareness of the issues of the situation (Leca, Naccache, 2006: 628). In fact, I mean 
that, by structural effects of the field, not everyone keeps the same social distance from the 
norm and not everyone has the same social dispositions to play with the norm in the sense of 
the “ enabling role of individual social position” (Battilana, 2006). In other words, there is an 
uneven distribution of the ability to play with the rules of the social game and the cogs of the 
social mechanism to transform it in line with interests. Without being thought in the rational 
sense of the term, these interests can be clearly understood on the practical level. As such, the 
institutional entrepreneur is a figure whose physiognomy and social position should be more 
clearly defined. 
 
Emergence of social skill 
 
  As emphasized by Fligstein (1997, 2001), the institutional entrepreneur has particular 
aptitudes and is a strategic actor endowed with a social skill (“these entrepreneurs are skilled 
strategic actors”, 2001: 106). “The idea of social skill”, according to Fligstein, “is that actors 
have to motivate others to cooperate. The ability to engage others in collective action is a 
social skill that proves pivotal to the construction and reproduction of local social orders” 
(Fligstein, 2001: 106). This undeniably talented individual can “understand the ambiguities” 
(2001: 114), has “a sense of what is possible and impossible” (2001: 114), and is a negotiator 
who is into “brokering more than blustering” (2001: 114). We are told that this skill gives a 
certain  practical  sense  of  situations,  the  effect  of  which  is  the  ability  to  bring  about  
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cooperation. The notion becomes a little clearer. Garud, Sunjay and Kumaraswamy (2002) 
highlight  “political  skills”  which  are  broken  down,  in  turn,  into  sub-categories  such  as 
“networking, bargaining and interest mediation skills”. In their study, Perkmann and Spicer 
(2007) complete this taxonomic effort by adding two additional categories to “political skill”: 
“analytical skill” and “cultural skills”. The conditions in which this resource is used are also 
highlighted and divided into three classes: “leveraged, convened, or accumulated” (Dorado, 
2005: 395). These studies culminating in types and categories ultimately tell us little about 
the profound nature of the resource. What is it? How can it be objectified? 
  One  of  the  most  recent  research  developments  has  been  analysis  of  discourse  and 
official  texts  (studied  as  discourse)  as  components  of  institutionalization  processes. 
Production of discourse is a social activity that is inseparable from organizational practices 
and  more  particularly  during  periods  of  change  when  discourse  is  a  crucial  support 
transformation. Reality is socially constructed through discursive processes giving rise to 
shared  meanings.  In  this  respect,  to  account  for  institutionalization  processes,  we  cannot 
ignore the linguistic activity that lies at the heart of construction of shared meaning in the 
field,  and  therefore  the  principle  of  construction  of  the  field,  its  conservation  or 
transformation.  The  mobilization  of  a  discursive  model  of  institutionalization  (Phillips, 
Lawrence and Hardy, 2004) represents, in my opinion, a first step towards objectifying the 
institutional  entrepreneur’s  resource.  Discourse  materializes  the  work  carried  out  by 
institutional entrepreneurs to bring influence to bear on the institutions that constrain their 
action and yet make it possible. 
 
  “The image of institutional entrepreneurs that is suggested by our model is as authors-
generators  of  influential  texts  that  are  aimed  at  influencing  the  nature  and  structure  of 
discourses and, in turn, affecting the institutions that are supported by those discourses”, 
(Phillips, Lawrence et Hardy, 2004: 648) 
  
  12 
  Performative statements (Austin, 1991) form or even establish the thing they refer to (“I 
pronounce you man and wife”, etc.). Here, discourse takes the form of a symbolic action, that 
of  transforming  by  merely  pronouncing  the  recognized  expression.  In  the  logic  of 
performative statements, the person who states  is often the  representative of institutional 
authority (State, Church, etc.): “by the powers invested in me, I hereby anoint you…”. In the 
case of institutional entrepreneurs, the situation is a little different. Often, they are endowed 
with no political power. Institutional entrepreneurs take power starting from scratch in a way, 
thereby  reintroducing  the  issue  of  power  to  new  institutionalism  (Phillips,  2003).  Often, 
institutional entrepreneurs have no other mandate than that they give themselves and which 
allows them to construct their own legitimacy. Discourse is therefore a key object of study 
because  it  enables  us  to  reveal  and  objectify  the  specific  resource  represented  by  the 
rhetorical or persuasive ability of the institutional entrepreneur, which is nothing other than 
the  expression  of  a  form  of  symbolic  power.  On  the  level  of  the  organizational  field, 
rhetorical strategies have been studied (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) but I do not believe 
this has been done yet on the individual level. To date, and subject to a more comprehensive 
inventory in our coming reading, I have the feeling that we remain relatively unfamiliar with 
the components of this resource used by institutional entrepreneurs. Objectification poses a 
problem. The study of discourse (Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy, 2004) or rhetoric (Suddaby, 
Greenwood, 2005) indicates a way forward. Discourse is a first step towards objectifying the 
resource or skill used by the institutional entrepreneur. This is a quite symbolic dimension of 
the resource and it seems possible to me to go into greater depth in this objectification work 
which  is  still  at  its  beginnings.  One  possibility  could  be  to  identify  the  resource  more 
precisely by breaking it down into various forms of capital, such  as the cultural capital, 
economic capital, social capital and symbolic capital (Pierre Bourdieu, 1992), combination of 
resources that I call institutional portfolio.  
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL FIELD AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEUR’S 
HABITUS 
 
Legitimacy of the theoretical approach 
 
  Such recourse to the theory of field and habitus is in no way a heretical approach, 
seeking  to  make  impertinent  (meaning  both  irreverent  and  intellectually  irrelevant). 
combinations.  It  should  be  remembered  that  my  project  is  based  on  a  theoretical 
complementarity.  Powell  and  DiMaggio  (1991)  emphasized  that  “Bourdieu’s  framework 
offers a particularly balanced and multifaceted approach to action. […] Much of it dovetails 
with and may contribute to a broadening and deepening of institutional tradition” (1991: 26). 
Bourdieu,  meanwhile,  admitted  that  he  felt  quite  close  to  organizational  institutionalism, 
acknowledging many “areas of overlapping and convergence” between “his oldest and most 
recent works and the works of new economic sociology” (Bourdieu, 1992: 238). In other 
words, the theoretical meeting can take place at least around the concept of field, a concept 
that both theories have in common. 
  For  neo-institutionalists,  the  organization  field  is  composed  of  a  number  of 
organizations,  united  by  the  same  activity,  which  in  time  constitute  a  recognized  and 
therefore  institutionalized  area  of  life  (“organizations  that,  in  the  aggregate,  constitute  a 
recognized  area  of  institutional  life:  key  suppliers,  resource  and  produce  consumers, 
regulatory  agencies,  and  other  organizations  that  produce  similar  services  and  products”, 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 143). To this first definition, which successfully names the 
elements involved in the life of the field, should be added the one proposed by Scott (1994:  
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207) which introduces two key elements: a) the relational intensity that makes it possible to 
outline the limits of the field; b) the concept of common meanings which highlights the 
principle of membership among participants in the activity of a given field (“the concept of 
field connotes the existence of a community of organizations that partakes of a common 
meaning  system  and  whose  participants  interact  more  frequently  and  fatefully  with  one 
another than with actors outside of the field”). Agreement on the meaning ascribed to the 
activity (common meaning system) makes possible the acceptance and sharing of rules in a 
particular  field  (the  stakeholders,  hierarchies  and  the  structure  of  relationships...).  Two 
elements that allow us to clarify the boundaries of the field (“in more stable and highly 
institutionalized  fields,  there  is  high  consensus  on  the  definitions  as  to  who  the  critical 
players  are,  what  activities  and  interactions  are  appropriate,  and  which  organizations  are 
included, marginal to, or outside field boundaries”, Scott, 1998: 129). The field is also an 
area run by a dynamic that can encounter theoretical avatars (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008). 
To begin with, neo-institutionalists proposed an isomorphic or mimetic conception of the 
field, according to which any change led paradoxically to a relative homogenization of forms 
and  organizational  practices  (DiMaggio  and  Powell,  1983).  Subsequently,  the  neo-
institutionalists took into account the “institutional logic” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) that 
irrigates the field and may be reflected in rivalries (“competing logics”) and power struggles 
(Lawrence 2008; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999), approaching in this way the field conception 
of Bourdieu. 
  The bourdieusian field is not limited to organization. Indeed, Bourdieu had never really 
taken organization into account. In this respect, our subsequent project, which consists in 
submitting the theory of field and habitus to the empirical “test” of organizational reality (i.e. 
consulting communication agencies), is an approach that seems so far to retain its originality. 
According to Bourdieu, the social world is composed of a large diversity of fields: to name  
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but  a  few,  there  is  the  political  field,  the  bureaucratic  field,  the  haute  couture  field,  the 
scientific field, the academic field, the religious field, the journalism field, the literary field, 
the corporate field… These fields are relatively independent of each other, meaning that they 
have their own specific rules, interests and issues. “Each of these fields corresponds to a 
fundamental viewpoint of the world which creates its own object and finds within itself the 
principle of understanding and explanation suited to that object” (Bourdieu, 1997: 119). In 
other words, each field has its own logic, its own vision (of the world), “institutionalization 
of a point of view in things and habituses, […] a specific mode of thinking (an eidos), a 
specific reality  construction principle based on  a pre-reflexive belief in the unchallenged 
value  of  the  instruments  of  construction  and  the  objects  thus  constructed  (an  ethos)” 
(Bourdieu,  1997:  120).  Any  field  betrays  a  vision  of  the  world  which  becomes 
institutionalized through practices and specific rules shared by the agents in the field. This 
“prereflexive” adherence is experienced in its most harmonious forms in the manner of a 
vocation  (“I’ve  always  wanted  to  be…”;  “I  was  made  for…”),  abolishing  any  distance 
between the logic of the field and the individual, and symbolizing the individual as becoming 
the field itself in the sense of being haunted and possessed by the field. We are close here to 
the “oversocialization” spoken of by Powell and DiMaggio (1991) for whom the individual 
has difficulty identifying interests and building up strategies. 
  In the class of circumstances in which the organizational field is relatively stable, the 
opportunities  for  transformation,  without  being  excluded,  are  nevertheless  reduced  and 
institutional reform becomes less probable. It is undoubtedly in this framework that social 
determinism is most marked, all the more so in the case of individuals who, like fish in water 
(that of their field), are not always aware of the forces they can mobilize and of the fact that, 
unconsciously, “dispositions are left to their own devices” (Bourdieu, Wacquant, 1992 : 111). 
However, events outside the field (environmental pressures) such as laws and regulations,  
  16 
technological progress, sociological changes… can bring about crises in the field creating 
rivalries which threaten the existing forms of power. In these conditions, one can sometimes 
observe a form of disalignment between the social properties of those who exert power and 
the  properties  associated  with  the  new  form  of  power  being  constituted  :  “the  routine 
adjustments of subjective structures (habitus) and objective structures (field) are suddenly 
broken”, thus creating “a class of circumstances in which rational choice can take over, at 
least among those agents who have the means of being rational, if we may put it like that” 
(Bourdieu, Wacquant, 1992 : 107). The field, as a space which is structured discriminatingly 
between positions exerting power over the field and subordinate positions, can turn out to be 
a place where individual or collective struggles for power take place between the holders of 
legitimate authority (i.e. the authority in place and acknowledged as such for the time being) 
and the candidates for it, that is those who intend to change the order of the field so as to re-
organize it in accordance with their own interests. “Those who, in a given state of the power 
struggle, monopolize (more or less completely) the specific capital, as being the foundation 
of power and the specific authority characterizing a field, are inclined to adopt strategies of 
conservation,  on  the  side  of  […]  orthodoxy,  whereas  those  who  are  least  endowed  with 
capital (who are often newcomers, most of the time, the youngest) are inclined to strategies 
of subversion, on the side of […] heresy”.. The heretical posture has something to do with 
that of the institutional entrepreneur, already mentioned (cf. supra, “organized actors with 
sufficient resources [who] see in [changes] an opportunity to realize an interest that they 
value highly”, DiMaggio, 1988: 14). 
  For  all  that,  the  most  subversive  initiatives  are  confronted  with  their  own  self-
censorship.  Strategies  of  subversion  carried  out  by  the  candidates  (or  heretics)  who  are 
strongly  inclined  to  bring  about  institutional  transformation  are  nevertheless  confined  to 
preserving  the  ultimate  interests  in  the  field  to  which  they  belong.  Indeed,  the  agents  
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committed to a field share, even in a situation of struggle and often unconsciously, common 
fundamental interests, an axiomatic or objective complicity, which can help separate what 
needs to be preserved (“repressed in the taken-for-grantedness and left in the state of doxa”
4) 
and what needs to be disputed or brought into play. That is why fields are places of “partial 
revolutions”, institutional arrangements which never really jeopardize the fundamentals, i.e. 
the institutional foundation on which any field relies. 
 
The habitus of institutional entrepreneurs: from embodied to reified institutions  
 
   In our view, mobilizing the notion of habitus is, as a Bourdieusian concept, the most 
meaningful contribution to the present neo-institutionalist debate. It enables us to pursue our 
analysis of the interaction between the individual and the structure (embedded agency) by 
offering the opportunity to objectify the distribution of the different types of resources held 
by the individuals engaged in initiatives concerning the functioning of institutions in relation 
to the structure of positions constituting the organizational field. 
  For  Bourdieu,  homo  oeconomicus  does  not  exist.  It  is  “a  sort  of  anthropological 
monster” (2000: 257) in the sense of a creation so pure that it is imperfect, a theoretical 
invention and an abstraction that cannot account for practice because it is condemned to the 
“amnesia of genesis”. The notion of habitus which functions inextricably with the notion of 
field,  breaks  away  from  the  rational  action  theory  or  rational  choice  theory,  by  which 
individuals act as universal rational agents, agents without a history, not economically and 
socially conditioned, making maximal use of their utilities in the sense of material profits at 
                                                 
4 Bourdieu makes a distinction between the “doxa” and the notion of “opinion”. A doxic relationship with the 
world  refers  to  habit,  reflex  and  the  unreflective…,  while  opinion  implies  consciousness  and  deliberate 
thinking. 
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every occasion, forming their choices freely, acting according to a deliberate, conscious end 
and using all available resources to achieve it.  
  In contrast, the notion of habitus proposes to construct and understand practice in its 
specific “logic” by situating it in time, in the chronology of its formation and the social space 
in which it is realized. “The conditioning associated with a particular class of conditions of 
existence  produces  habitus,  durable  and  transposable  systems  of  dispositions,  structured 
structures  predisposed  to  operate  as  structuring  structures,  which  is  to  say  as  principles 
generating and organizing representations that can be objectively adapted to the goal without 
supposing a conscious view of the ends and express mastery of the operations required to 
achieve them, objectively “regulated” and “regular” without being in any way the product of 
obedience to rules and  being all these things, collectively orchestrated without being the 
product of the organizing activity of a conductor” (Bourdieu, 1980: 88-89). 
  Among  the  fundamental  properties  of  the  habitus,  its  historic  and  social  dimension 
should be pointed out. As the product of particular, socially-formed historic conditioning, the 
habitus,  the  “interiorization  of  exterior  values”,  is  acquired  through  practice  and  is 
“constantly oriented towards practice”. It is the incorporation of a particular social history 
and  the  generator  of  a  specific  social  history  expressed  in  the  form  of  singular  social 
trajectories. “To speak of habitus, is to state that the individual, and even the personal and 
subjective,  is  social  and  collective.  The  habitus  is  a  socialized  subjectivity”  (Bourdieu, 
Wacquant, 1992: 101). On this point, Bourdieu differs from the notion of bounded rationality 
(March and Simon, 1958): “rationality is limited not only because the available information 
is  limited,  because  there  are  not  the  means  to  think  through  every  situation  completely, 
especially  in  urgency  and  action,  but  also  because  the  human  mind  is  socially  limited, 
socially structured, and is always, whether we like it or not, imprisoned – even if we are 
aware of it – “within the limits of the brain”, as Marx said, which is to say within the limits  
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of  the  system  of  categories  it  owes  to  its  training”  (Bourdieu,  Wacquant,  1992:  102). 
Therefore, if individuals limit their choices, it is not only because they do not have the means 
to process a large quantity of information, which is not always available to them anyway, but 
above all because due to their habitus, the naturalization of past conditioning which is always 
there unnoticed, the past weighs subconsciously on their decisions and on the strategies they 
elaborate.  The  habitus,  the  social  economy  of  practice,  enables  the  individual  to  act 
“naturally” in a given field without having to reflect and calculate before every move, the 
famous “collective orchestration without a conductor”. 
  Contrary  to  the  reductionist  discourse  of  critics  of  Bourdieu,  the  habitus  −  in  its 
Bourdieu’s version 
5 − is in no way mechanistic. It is essential to emphasize this point. The 
habitus  does  not  condemn  individuals  to  mechanically  sterile  conduct  consisting  in 
reproducing the conditions of their conditioning, by habit or by reflex, in the acts of their 
daily life. How is it possible to conjugate within this single notion of the habitus, on the one 
hand the incorporation  of the social, or  what  we could  call an institutionalization of the 
individual, determining their acts – very close in this respect to the routines and cognitive 
scripts driving actors incapable of clearly identifying their interests (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991) − and, on the other, the possibility given to the actor to undertake, within certain 
limits,  original  actions  of  creation,  invention,  improvisation,  adaptation  to  new 
circumstances… – coming close here to the notion of cooptation in the sense of Selznick 
(1949), although without agreeing with it completely – because Bourdieu, without denying 
the reason behind the acts, does play down is clearly conscious design: “actions that are 
reasonable without being the product of a reasoned design or, even more so, of a rational 
calculation;  [are]  inhabited  by  a  sort  of  objective  purpose  without  being  consciously 
organized in relation to an explicitly formed end” (Bourdieu, 1980: 86). 
                                                 
5 The notion of habitus has also been addressed and developed by many thinkers, such as Aristotle, Leibniz, 
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Norbert Elias…  
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  Overcoming  the  binary  conception  seeking  to  oppose,  irreconcilably  and  counter-
productively, the free rational subject (“the uncreated creator”) and the structurally-driven 
agent imprisoned by the conditions of its own production, is made possible by the habitus in 
two ways. First, because in Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus, there is a difference between 
individual  habituses.  Although  experiences  common  to  the  members  of  the  same  class, 
notably  earliest  experiences,  bring  about  “unique integration”,  the  difference  between 
individuals “resides in the singularity of their social trajectories to which correspond series of 
chronologically-ordered  determinations  that  are  mutually  irreducible  to  one  another”. 
(Bourdieu, 1980: 100-102). Second, because the habitus, while being socially determined, is 
also a “generating” principle. It engenders conduct that may be new, and this is one of its 
fundamental properties. The habitus admittedly allows “external forces to be exerted”, those 
of the socialization of the individual and those of the fields in which the individual positions 
himself, but actualization (exteriorization of interior values) is performed “according to the 
specific  logic  of  the  bodies  in  which  they  are  incorporated”  (Bourdieu,  1980:  88-89). 
Actualization is therefore largely conditioned by the conditions of production of the habitus 
which “may be accompanied by strategic calculations of cost and profit which tend to bring 
the operations the habitus performs according to its own logic to the level of the conscious” 
(Bourdieu, Wacquant, 1992: 107). “Generating principle”, “open system of dispositions”… 
the  habitus  is  confronted  with,  and  affected  by  new  experiences,  thereby  giving  rise  to 
improvised actions or creative actions. 
  Whatever the degree of individual consciousness attributed to individuals regarding the 
dispositions they can make use of, it should be stressed that the habitus tend to remain restive 
and  recalcitrant.  It  is  no  doubt  for  this  reason  that  Bourdieu  is  likened  to  a  thinker  of 
reproduction (not to mention the reductive and therefore negative effects of a philosophy that 
is rich yet complex and no doubt not easily accessible, caused by the sometimes provocative  
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titles of some of his works, such as Les Héritiers, 1964 (with Passeron); La Reproduction, 
1970 (with Passeron) or La Noblesse d’Etat (1989). The habitus possesses the characteristic 
of  protecting  and  preserving  itself.  In  this  respect,  it  operates  according  to  a  “unifying” 
principle. The earliest experiences (or original social conditions) involved in the formation of 
the structures that generate preferences – that make up the habitus – form a particularly 
selective  system  of  categories  of  perception  and  appreciation  (“schemes”)  that  tends  to 
privilege recognition of that which is “close” or “already experienced,” and to keep things 
that  are  new  or  challenge  the  initial  system  of  experience  at  a  distance.  A  little  like 
psychologists proposing to explain the reduction of cognitive dissonance by forgetting those 
things  that  do  not  fit  with  prior  acquisitions,  by  the  process  known  as  rationalization 
(Festinger, 1957). In this way, the habitus “shelters itself from crises and critical questioning 
[…]. It provides for its own consistency and its own defense against change through the 
selection it makes between new items of information, rejecting, in the event of fortuitous or 
forced exposure, the information capable of challenging the information it has accumulated, 
and above all discouraging exposure to such information (Bourdieu, 1980: 90-91, 100-102). 
In this way, the habitus ensures the maintenance and regularity of conduct, and as such it is a 
unifier. 
  Mobilizing the habitus can therefore help to analyze practical institutional action – an 
apparently and deliberately individual action which nevertheless includes a share of social 
unthought  –  when  it  concerns  micro-individual  action  in  relation  to  the  structure  of  the 
organization  (meso)  and  the  field  (macro).  This  conception  of  action  therefore  brings 
together several levels of analysis which are often studied separately in neo-institutionalist 
research.  The  habitus  brings  us  to  think  about  the  social  element  in  any  individual’s 
organizational action. In the course of their socialization (in the family, at school, at work…) 
individuals come to possess something which could regarded as a form of institutional DNA.  
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Given the specific forms of conditioning within “a particular class of living conditions”, an 
individual possesses a particular institutional combination which both shapes their vision of 
the world and is at the centre of their creative actions. We can say then that the individual, as 
an undeniable product of a process of institutionalization (and, in this respect, an embodied 
institution)  but  not  without  the  ability  to  think  and  to  act,  includes  even  in  their  most 
deliberate and thought-out actions a share of institutional unthought which is projected in 
their actions and inspires them (reified institutions). In other words, behind even the most 
“strategic” thought lies, necessarily, an institutional motive of which the agent is not fully 
conscious but which marks the action experienced by the individual as an illusion of full and 
complete freedom and of rational decisions. In this respect, the habitus provides precious 
support,  when  episodes  of  institutional  disturbance  are  being  considered,  by  allowing 
questions  to  be  raised  about  the  role  of  the  protagonists’  personal  dispositions  in 
deinstitutionalization and reinstitutionalization, and thus making it possible to plunge into the 
heart of the institutional fabric.  
 
Objectifying resources: structure of capitals in the institutional portfolio 
 
    Breaking  with  the  antihistoricity  of  economic  interest  conceived  as  universal  and 
natural,  the  interest  in  the  general  theory  of  the  field  and  habitus  is  plural,  cultural  and 
contingent,  “there  is  not  one  interest  but  interests,  variable  in  time  and  place,  almost 
infinitely […] there are as many interests as there are fields, like historically-formed playing 
fields with their specific institutions and their own operating laws” (1984b, 24-25). Interest is 
therefore specifically conditioned by the working of a field, meaning that from one field to 
another,  everyone  is  not  chasing  after  the  same  things,  everyone  is  not  competing  or 
struggling  with  their  neighbor  for  the  same  reasons.  To  simplify  things  a  little,  if  the  
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differences in interests from one field to another were to be outlined, it could be said that the 
interest of the businessman (competition for economic gain) is not the same as that of a man 
of  the  church  (salvation  and  spiritual  purity),  or  that  the  interest  of  the  soldier  (honor, 
sacrifice and courage) differs from that of the academic (intellectual improvement through 
knowledge  and  the  transmission  of  knowledge).  A  given  organizational  field  (i.e. 
communication consulting field) can be a space of “competitive logics” (Lounsbury, 2007; 
Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, 1999). To consider interest solely from the point of view of 
economism, is to accept that forms of interest be neglected which, in the worst case, will go 
unnoticed, and in the “best” case will be perceived as being disinterested, gratuitous or even 
pointless and without economic foundation. There can be no investment or commitment to a 
field without an interest for the specific issues of the field in question : “investment is the 
inclination to act, engendered in the relation between a playing field offering certain issues 
(what I call a field), and a system of dispositions adapted to this game (what I call a habitus), 
with a sense of the game and the issues implying both the inclination and the ability to play 
the game, to take an interest in the game and to get involved in the game” (1980: 33-35). 
  To account for the multiple forms of investments and profits made, resources (capitals) 
must therefore be deployed in all the forms at the disposal of the individual. Capital can 
come  in  many  shapes.  I  will  present  four  main  ones  here,  which  are  those  most  often 
encountered in the works of Bourdieu: economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital. These 
different forms of capital are irreducible to each other, although often closely related, and 
form  what  I  should  call  an  institutional  portfolio,  the  structure  of  which  is  unevenly 
distributed according to the classes of individuals. 
  Economic capital as defined by Bourdieu differs somewhat from capital as conceived 
by the economists. The expression refers not only to the assets – all the material  goods 
possessed by an individual, such as an apartment, house, jewelry, shares or bonds, real estate  
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property  such  as  land  or  forests…  -  but  also  income  from  work  or  these  assets,  as  this 
provides for a certain standard of living, or even building up or rebuilding of personal assets. 
  Cultural  capital  or  informational  capital  is  broken  down  into  three  forms:  1.  Its 
incorporated state, meaning in the form of durable dispositions of the organism (for example, 
ways of doing things, such as dressing, receiving guests, setting a table, table manners…; and 
also  ways  of  saying  things,  such  as  introducing  oneself,  expressing  thanks,  regrets, 
forgiveness, using appropriate polite expressions…). 2. Its objectified state in the form of 
material cultural goods such as books, encyclopedias, furniture, paintings, works of art or 
even  listed  monuments…  3.  its  institutionalized  state,  mainly  school  qualifications  and 
diplomas, a “certificate of cultural competence which confers on its holder a conventional, 
constant, legally guaranteed value with respect to power” (1979). 
  Social capital comprises all the current or potential resources of an individual or group 
due to the fact that they have a durable network of more-or-less institutionalized relations, 
acquaintances and mutual recognition; in other words, it is the sum of the capital and power 
that can be mobilized by belonging to a network or a group of individuals that is not only 
endowed with common properties, but is also united by durably maintained ties (even if 
some may be inherited: family relations) and useful ties of a nature to procure material or 
symbolic benefits. Belonging to socially exclusive clubs such as the Polo Club, Racing Club, 
Automobile Club de France, Yacht Club… is a rather good illustration of what social capital 
or “having relations” can mean. 
  Symbolic capital is without doubt the most complex type of capital to grasp. Symbolic 
capital is the form taken by any of the previous three forms of capital (economic, cultural or 
social)  when  it  is  denied  and  symbolically  transfigured  to  be  rendered  acceptable  and 
therefore endure in the “arbitrariness of its possession and accumulation”. For example, in Le 
sens pratique (1980), Bourdieu points out that the principle of the pre-capitalist (or archaic)  
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economy resides in the fact that “economic action cannot explicitly recognize the economic 
ends towards which it is objectively oriented” (1980: 193). Thus, “In an economy which is 
defined by the refusal to recognize the ‘objective’ truth of ‘economic’ practices, that is, the 
law  of  ‘naked’  self  and  selfish  calculation,  even  ‘economic’  capital  cannot  act  unless  it 
succeeds in being recognized through a conversion that can render unrecognizable the true 
principle of its efficacy. Symbolic capital is this denied capital,  recognized as legitimate 
capital, which is to say misrecognized as capital […] which is, along with religious capital, 
the only possible form of accumulation when economic capital is not recognized” (1980: 
200). 
  The specific combination of the resources previously listed and held by the individual 
in variable proportions in the form of what I call an institutional portfolio, can help shed light 
on the singular nature of institutional entrepreneurs’ dispositions or, to put it differently, 
objectify  the  components  of  their  “social  skill”  (Fligstein,  1997,  2001)  resulting  in  their 
commitment to initiatives of institutional transformation. Relating the combination of these 
resources to the structure of the field enables us to note that there is no such thing as an 
institutional  entrepreneur  endowed  with  indeterminate  “social  skill”  as  research  seems  to 
suggest. There is, however, a significant variation in the distribution of resources resulting in 
the disposition to act and the meaning of this disposition is only clear when related to the 
structure of the field. In other words, an observer pressed for time can see that institutional 
initiatives  have  something  to  do  with  the  freedom  of  action  of  talented  and  charismatic 
individuals. Our aim is to qualify this view. One cannot ignore the fact that the disposition to 
engage in institutional initiatives is also and above all a product of the history of socialized 
individuals whose specific socialization echoes more or less the evolution or the history of 
the  field  and  that  the  alignment  of  individual  dispositions  with the  structure  of the field 
favours a commitment to the institutional fabric.  




  As we have attempted to show in this article, Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of field and 
habitus  fits  harmoniously  into  the  neo-institutionalist  theoretical  framework,  thus 
contributing in an original and stimulating way to deepening the notion of “social skill” put 
forward by Fligstein (1997, 2001). Indeed, the approach, via resources, that we put forward 
can make a relevant contribution to the institutionalist research whose aim is to reach a better 
understanding  of  institutional  work.  The  institutional  work  carried  out  by  institutional 
entrepreneurs  is  made  newly  intelligible  through  the  habitus  and  the  objectification  of 
resources within an institutional portfolio essentially made up of symbolic, economic, social 
and cultural capitals.  
  By using the institutional portfolio to analyze institutional creation or revision present 
in a given organizational field, we can thus objectify the components of what constitutes the 
ability  to  act.  But  above  all,  its  differential  structure,  depending  on  various  classes  of 
individuals, in relation to the transformation of the structure of a given organizational field at 
various times in its history (especially in times of crisis or tension), enables us to grasp the 
evolution of the type of resources which provide the greatest legitimacy in the field: in other 
words to account precisely for the institutional foundations of change at the individual level 
without losing sight of the field. 
  From a practical point of view, this approach can contribute to clarifying the effects 
of opportunity resulting from the transformation of some organizational fields. In certain 
conditions, particularly those of structural disturbance preceding transformations at variable 
degrees, the field opens out (temporarily), allowing at least two forms of movements:  
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1. The entry of new types of individuals into the field. Indeed, the structural disturbance can 
help to modify – and not lower – the “barriers” for newcomers (candidates) who are often the 
youngest, creating opportunities for applicants with non-orthodox profiles.  
2. Mobility within the field. For the agents already present in the field but who have long held 
subordinate positions on the grounds of non-accordance with orthodoxy, i.e. a question of 
social un-skill which has nothing to do with the technical skill required for a particular job, 
disturbance  can  create  the  conditions  for  remobilization  in  the  sense  of  professional 
motivation driven by a likelihood of promotion.  
  Objectifying the structure of the field at key stages of its history and relating it to the 
structure of all the kinds of resources held by the agents in the field can reveal the most 
favourable circumstances in one type of combination or portfolio of resources rather than 
another. We sense here the advantage there would be for young people unfamiliar with a 
field in getting to know the traditional “conditions of resources” so as to gain access to them 
and to the opportunities resulting from disturbance in the field. A utopian scenario would 
consist in mapping out a set of organizational fields coveted by students in business schools 
like finance, strategy consultancy… in order to reveal their specific logic and their implicit 
sophisticated rules, concealed more or less subtly behind declarations such as “welcoming 
and  encouraging  all  young  talents  wherever  they  come”.  This  could  have  the  effect  of 
revealing the possible or probable “mechanisms” of transformation of fields for the benefit of 
all the uninitiated.  
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